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Education and the dislike society: The impossibility of
learning in filter bubbles
Benjamin Herm-Morris
Modern Languages and Cultures, University of Durham, Durham, UK
ABSTRACT
As we begin to witness a new phase in the integration of digital social
media platforms with educational institutions, we ought to ask how
learning exchanges may be altered as a result. Looking to transforma-
tions in knowledge exchanges outside of formal education, we find that
these technologies have already modified the ways in which commun-
ities engage with each other. Gerlitz and Helmond explain that the Like
Economy built into all major social media platforms flattens exchanges
between users to engagement metrics. With online communities
increasingly isolated from each other thanks to inscrutable recommen-
dation algorithms, the most frequent cross-community exchanges mani-
fest in outbursts of rage, producing a so-called ‘Dislike Society’.
Practitioners would rather briefly unite to tear down other ways of living
than to build new ones. Within the Dislike Society, any form of know-
ledge that could shape new communities is lost to the governance of
algorithms in what Bernard Stiegler calls ‘proletarianisation’. To re-apply
knowledge to the improvement of life, as suggested by Whitehead, the
attention of learners needs to be shaped in response to new techno-
logical conditions. This is best achieved within the educational institu-
tions that now face a reorganisation by the same companies that
brought us the Dislike Society.
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Whilst educational institutions have seen creeping integration of external software and digital
platforms for years, the recent COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the reliance on commercial-
grade, pre-packaged products like Zoom, Microsoft 365 and G-Suite. This current stage of
‘zoomified’ learning is merely the latest, albeit accelerated, phase in a larger development that
sees learning processes, both inside and outside traditional learning institutions, subsumed to
exchanges dictated by Silicon Valley companies. The allure of simplicity in familiar software to
structure and deliver education comes at the price of control, for teachers and learners, over the
learning exchanges they have with each other.
Outside of brick-and-mortar institutions, the knowledge that stitches society together is
already being ravaged by an economy that prioritises ‘engagement’ over the livelihoods of indi-
viduals and their communities. Carolin Gerlitz and Anne Helmond explain how this ‘Like econ-
omy’ reduces our online exchanges to engagement metrics in order to monetise them. Groups
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of users are closed off in so-called ‘filter bubbles’, where recommendation models ensure they
primarily view small variations on the same content. The means by which to build new commun-
ities in order to live better is externalised in opaque algorithms and thereby produces a loss of
that knowledge, which Bernard Stiegler refers to as ‘proletarianisation’ (Stiegler, 2013, loc. 2479).
The result is a phenomenon of ever more fractious online-offline interactions that we might
collectively term the Dislike Society. It is at the heart of rising hatred between established com-
munities and partially responsible for the failure of political movements to provide lasting alter-
natives to inadequate ways of life. For example, whilst the Brexit referendum succeeded in
unifying a narrow majority of UK citizens from separate political spheres against EU membership,
we are yet to see any viable alternatives to it. Within the Dislike Society, hate becomes the pri-
mary mode of communication between communities who increasingly view each other as exist-
ential threats. Now, this phenomenon that is built into the systems we use to communicate is
poised to also take over exchanges within educational institutions.
Countries like the UK are directing teachers towards companies like Microsoft and Google
(Department for Education, 2020). However, the promise of pre-packaged, feature-rich suites of
familiar tools threatens to reproduce the Dislike Society within the institutions best equipped to
supplant it. The solution is not to abandon all digital platforms but to close the gap between
society and its new technologies by placing users in control of community-building processes.
This paper examines what these processes are.
Hyper-segmentation and the Like economy
If our social interactions are so strongly governed by Silicon Valley, it is because of the immense
structuring power its technology possesses. It is a process that has been set in motion since
before Silicon Valley and before digital media. It is bound up with our consumption-based econ-
omy and digital social media merely represents the current pinnacle in corporations’ ability to
manipulate a market governed by consumer behaviour.
Antoinette Rouvroy and Thomas Berns explain how the algorithms employed by digital
platforms instantly and automatically group together and separate users in a process called
‘hyper-segmentation’ (2013, p. 176). What this means is that users experience a specialised and
accelerated version of what Bernard Stiegler identifies as ‘hyper-synchronisation’. Hyper-syn-
chronisation is a strategy from broadcast era marketing that exposes consumers to the same
content en masse to level out behaviours, leaving no room for local deviation (Stiegler, 2010, p.
44). Hyper-segmentation gives the illusion of greater freedom from an external perspective.
However, any local deviation in a grouping of consumers merely places that consumer in a dif-
ferent grouping. The scope of a group’s probable interactions is already accounted for by what
Rouvroy and Berns call ‘algorithmic governmentality’. Algorithms present users with content that
reaffirms those predicted behaviours, creating positive feedback loops where, e.g. Star Wars fans
buy Star Wars merchandise because all their friends and favourite influencers keep reminding
them of Star Wars. This creates what Eli Pariser calls ‘filter bubbles’.
By tailoring online content to fit our recorded and processed affiliations, algorithmic govern-
mentality generates enclosed spheres of users who struggle to encounter the content from bub-
bles they are not associated with. What this produces is hyper-synchronisation within filter
bubbles. These small worlds within which we are placed automatically can seem mostly ‘cosy’,
insofar as they consist of our favourite content and are mostly free of any views that might bring
our own into question (Pariser, 2011, p. 11). Creating digital environments filled with content we
affiliate with is the basic premise of the ‘Like economy’ identified by Carolin Gerlitz and Anne
Helmond. They recount how Facebook’s developers established a monetisation model that pla-
ces it at the forefront of digital marketing. It improved upon Google’s hit and link economy (that
gives priority to sites that are more frequently linked to by others) by adding a dimension of
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‘sociality and connectivity to create an infrastructure in which social interactivity and user affects
are instantly turned into valuable consumer data’ (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013, p. 2). By digitally
capturing our relationships, the Like economy monetises affiliation.
After the success of its one-dimensional Like button, Facebook introduced Reactions in 2016,
adding five new possible ways of interacting with content. Today, Reactions give us seven ways
of expressing affective feedback online, yet, as far as Facebook is concerned, these are only
seven ways of communicating the same thing: engagement. A product manager at Facebook
explained that the platform ‘will initially use any Reaction similar to a Like to infer that you want
to see more of that type of content’ (Krug, 2016). Since then, little has changed. Facebook’s rec-
ommendation algorithms remain opaque and pressing the ‘angry’ Reaction still counts as a Like.
The Like economy has spread far beyond Facebook and is a staple of social media platforms.
Some have more overt forms of ‘negative’ engagement. YouTube has Like and Dislike buttons
for its videos and although little is officially published, consensus among creators is that both
Likes and Dislikes promote content as identical markers for engagement.1
Exclusively positive forms of engagement may seem to align with Facebook’s outlook on
bringing people together in happy unity, however Gerlitz and Helmond point out that the
recording of negative relationships does not fit with Facebook’s algorithmic model based on
positive connections (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013, p. 15). Whilst the resulting filter bubbles might
be largely cosy, models exclusively based on positive relationships may not be ideal for learning.
It is fair to suggest, however, that online engagement is often less than amiable, in spite of social
media’s best efforts. Far from being a mere design flaw, it could be argued that mass outpour-
ings of hate and online bullying are direct consequences of the Like economy.
How to make a dislike society
In So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed (2016), the journalist Jon Ronson describes how waves of pub-
lic shaming can grip social media platforms and seemingly reach across filter bubbles to unite
users in opposition. He interviews Justine Sacco, head of public relations for the publishing firm
IAC who became the target of such an attack in 2013 after tweeting an unpopular joke before
boarding a flight to Cape Town: ‘Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!’
(p. 64). Branded an irredeemable racist, Sacco lost her job before she turned her smartphone on
after landing. Explaining herself after the fact, Sacco states that ‘living in America puts us in a bit
of a bubble when it comes to what is going on in the Third World. I was making fun of that
bubble’ (p. 69). Whether or not this was indeed Sacco’s original intention, the tweet was worded
ambiguously enough that she had no chance to react to an initial outcry.
This emphasises a key point about filter bubbles. They feel like safe spaces because they are
filled with similar content. Sacco’s followers would not respond negatively to her “jokes” because
they either agreed or never saw them. However, that one post was suddenly distributed to other
Twitter filter bubbles thanks to journalists like Sam Biddle, who shared it to their followers
(p. 73). Beyond simply having more eyes on her gauche tweet, this meant that Sacco was judged
within the norms of other filter bubbles, by users who would never exchange in that way and
would not find her funny. Her ‘cosy’, safe environment was replaced with an unforgiving one
that judged her free of context. Misunderstood or not, Sacco’s tweet would have been impos-
sible to defend within the new bubbles it was shared to.
By design, each bubble only allows for restricted diversity in its forms of exchange. These
forms of exchange are not controlled by the users. First of all, Gerlitz and Helmond observe that
platforms limit possible exchanges at the level of the interface. Second, Hui and Halpin have
remarked that the network, as the online model for society, also imposes rigid determinations
on the ways in which we interact, by treating each essentialised individual as a node, as well as
the content they share (Hui & Halpin, 2013, pp. 105–106). This leaves no scope for Gilbert
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Simondon’s concept of psychic and collective individuation, which rejects the notion of the indi-
vidual as a pre-conceived, atomistic unit in favour of a focus on the process. According to
Simondon, internal, psychic individuation and external, collective individuation are reciprocal and
are co-constitutive (Simondon, 2005, p. 29). This means that our cognitive transformations are
mediated by our environments and we transform them in turn. Yet the environment in question
is the social network, which cannot be modified or repurposed by the individual. Conversely, the
network is perpetually defining us as fixed digital constructs, comprised of binary affiliations
measured by engagement.
On Twitter, what constitutes racism or white privilege is inconsequential. You either are a
racist, or you are not. Each user is placed into a category based on Like economy algorithms out-
side of their control. Each positive or constructive exchange is neatly categorised by an algo-
rithm and assigned to a filter bubble. As a consequence, if a user’s affiliations no longer match
their bubble, they are promptly assigned a new one. This leads to very little deviation in relation-
ships within each bubble. What this also means is that content from outside the bubble is met
with hostility because it is at odds with the prescribed relationships already in place. This does
not mean that content is no longer spread. As negative reactions to it are measured as engage-
ment, the node in question gains connections and can be recommended to other users who
would otherwise not encounter anything like it in their environments. This can create a
Cambrian explosion of hatred, producing exchanges across filter bubbles that would not arise
out of positive affiliation. The Like economy, which hands control of affiliations and socially con-
structive exchanges over to inscrutable algorithms, is the main driver behind what might be
more aptly named the Dislike Society.
Disruption: Knowledge in the dislike society
In December 2018, YouTube published Rewind, its annual video tribute to its content creators.
As of writing, it remains the most disliked video in the history of the platform. It was produced
to celebrate YouTube’s diversity of content, the talent of its creators and to briefly unify consum-
ers from different online factions around one video. In spite of its 14% approval rating, it is still
a very successful piece of content, currently counting 208.5 million views (YouTube, 2018). This
figure still compares somewhat closely with the most watched YouTube Rewind videos of all:
2016 and 2017, with 239 and 235 million views respectively. By contrast, their approval ratings
seem much better, with 87% and 66% each. Rewind 2018 is a good example of the Dislike
Society at work: consumers from separate bubbles uniting against specific content on
social media.
Aside from its reception, 2018s video differed from the other two in another way. Whilst they
portrayed different content creators teaming up for long dance routines, 2018 had creators sep-
arately express their thoughts on various issues they connected with, including creativity, society,
culture and mental health. This forced established exchanges from diverse bubbles into each
other, meeting with the inevitable disapproval discussed above. This does not by any means
imply that different cultures or filter bubbles cannot or should not connect with each other in
constructive ways. However, a perfunctory collision of symbols does not substitute for the nego-
tiations between ideas necessary to create new knowledge and thus, new communities. We can
observe similar juxtapositions that fail to produce unity in contemporary politics.
Engaging in large political debates today inevitably entails an encounter with the Dislike
Society. From Donald Trump’s promises to drain the swamp and wall off Mexico, to Brexiteers’
hopes of escaping EU sovereignty; from Extinction Rebellion’s protests against ineffective
responses to climate change to the Gilets Jaunes’ marches against the French State: in spite of
their differences, they share a unification of their otherwise politically fractured supporters
around attempts at dismantling existing systems. Beyond joining in opposition, these
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communities rarely communally build alternative ways of living. The UK still has no trade deal.
The climate is still collapsing. Donald Trump still regularly contradicts himself. This is how
Bernard Stiegler’s interpretation of proletarianisation may reveal itself. We are incapable of know-
ing how to live differently, let alone better.
Dislike Societies are prone to this loss of knowledge because they systematically prevent
‘consensus’. Consensus goes beyond agreeing on how not to live and establishes how to live
both differently and better. To understand what this means, we must explore Thomas Kuhn’s
analysis of the history of knowledge via paradigms. Kuhn sees knowledge as a constantly chang-
ing process. We are most familiar with the stage of this process called ‘normal science’. Normal
science relies on consensus among peers, who agree on ‘the same rules and standards for scien-
tific practice’ (Kuhn, 1996, p. 11). In normal science, researchers have agreed on the best
exchanges with their environment to make new discoveries. The same is true of filter bubbles,
where users learn the exchanges that their peers use to live within that environment. These
norms can be anything from a shared vocabulary to ‘life hacks’. The difference is that in filter
bubbles, the algorithm is in charge of who your peers are and what exchanges they share.
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend also examine the ‘incommensurability’ between para-
digms, which means that they ‘cannot be used simultaneously and neither logical nor perceptual
connections can be established between them’ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 169). Incommensurability
means that paradigms cannot communicate or be compared with each other. Algorithmic gov-
ernmentality fosters incommensurability between filter bubbles by habituating users to an
accepted set of exchanges within their bubbles. The exchanges from other bubbles may make
little to no sense to them. For example, addressing an adult as ‘honey’, ‘girl’ or ‘bitch’ may have
very different connotations for the conservative Joe Rogan fan community, when compared with
the LGBTQþ RuPaul fan community.2
Incommensurability is the irreconcilable gap between types of consensus and the main reason
why paradigms of knowledge do not change gradually but suddenly shift. Paradigms remain
relatively stable until ‘an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration
of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way’ (Kuhn, 1996, p.
92). When an environment is sufficiently perturbed that the paradigms that used to govern
exchanges within it no longer allow practitioners to explain (or live in) it, a crisis occurs.
Simondon’s concept of individuation is similar in that an individual is considered as a process
going through successive phases together with its associated environment. The coupling of indi-
vidual-environment sets up exchanges that make up that phase of individuation. When changes
occur in this coupling that render that phase inadequate for sustaining life, then a phase shift
occurs (Simondon, 2005, pp. 65-66). Each phase is ‘metastable’ because it contains within it the
potential for a renewed shift.
The Dislike Society is generative of crises because in spite of filter bubbles it lets incommen-
surable content slip through, producing outrage. Outrage is the only possible response because
users are so conditioned to the exchanges within their own environments that they cannot com-
municate with others effectively. The violence of hate mobs is testimony to the fact that commu-
nication is unwanted. However, crises are important to knowledge processes because they are
preludes to a revolution, or phase shift. Paul Feyerabend confirms that rigid stability of know-
ledge ‘indicates that we have failed [… ] to rise to a higher stage of consciousness and of under-
standing. It is even questionable whether we can still claim to possess knowledge in such a
state’ (Feyerabend, 1970, p. 30). Revolutions require crises and yet, instead of initiating a process
of ‘retooling’ (Kuhn, 1996, p. 76) within knowledge, outbursts of hate in the Dislike Society are
only followed by a sedated return to the bubble’s habitual exchanges. For Stiegler, the impera-
tive for retooling in a crisis is quite literal.
Stiegler explains that a moment of crisis that can give rise to a paradigm shift always coin-
cides with the emergence of a new ‘pharmakon’ (Stiegler, 2018b, p. 103). Stiegler’s concept of
pharmacology indicates the simultaneously curative and toxic potential of technics. The
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pharmakon of digital social media contains within it the curative potential to connect people
and ideas to produce new forms of knowledge. In 2020 and beyond, we can connect learners in
spite of needs for social distancing. We can question ways of living collectively and establish
new ones without dismantling democracy and leaving nothing in its place. Georges Canguilhem
asserts that pathological existence is not necessarily the loss of old norms by which to live but
the inability to establish new ones in their wake (Canguilhem, 1966, p. 91). This theory is strongly
aligned with Feyerabend’s call for the flexibility necessary to create new knowledge. The tools to
encourage it are available, yet we are locked out of them. Instead of algorithms that encourage
hatred and destruction, we could use them to channel those collective forces into creating new
norms that benefit new ways of life. In order to do this, we need to collectively be involved in
retooling, rather than adopting pre-packaged and fully externalised structures of exchange.
However, as Stiegler argues in Dans la disruption (2016), this short circuiting of processes of
knowledge creation is the business model of digital consumer capitalism.
Going beyond Gerlitz and Helmond’s Like economy, Stiegler explains that digital social media
automatically captures all traces of its users’ digital memories and uses it to disrupt or short cir-
cuit their desires (Stiegler, 2016, p. 23). These desires, hopes and expectations are what we use
to invest in a future for ourselves, both on a personal and collective level. The speed and access
granted to algorithmic governmentality means that we stand no chance of establishing new
norms before it inserts itself. If we express interest in climate change through our online
exchanges, we are more likely to be put in contact with adverts for electric cars and paper
straws than with people with whom we could discuss green lifestyles and plans for political cli-
mate action. Without access to the algorithms that govern these exchanges, we will always
struggle with the self-insertion of the Like economy.
Manipulation on this scale can give rise to the sentiment that our affiliations are no longer
our own. Scrolling through our tailored content and advertising, whose lines of division are
becoming increasingly blurred, we may occasionally pause and wonder what online engagement
caused us to suddenly see so many adverts for dental products. As consumers become more
and more aware of their own manipulation, they may begin to unconsciously recognise that the
only thing that truly belongs to them is their hate. In the Dislike Society, despising each other is
an assertion of free will. To heal from this toxicity in digital social media, we need to engage in
long processes of reconstructive knowledge to produce new methods of harnessing it to more
curative ends. We will need to narrow what is called the dis-adjustment between social and tech-
nical systems. Bertrand Gille originally observed this need for institutions and society to catch up
after technological shifts (Gille, 1978, p. 1018). Stiegler expands on this idea, integrating it with
Simondon’s analysis of phase shifts. Dis-adjustment characterises the period of crisis between
paradigms, where institutions of the old paradigm can no longer keep up with, nor re-integrate
technological change (Stiegler, 2016, p. 32). If crises are initiated by the emergence of new
pharmacological technologies that initially suspend existing ways of living, then the inability to
repurpose those technologies within new modes of exchange hinders our exit out of crisis. This
places new importance on the regulation of digital social media that seems so difficult
to achieve.
Education in service of life
We are still reeling from digital social media’s interference in democratic elections and referen-
dums. Its involvement in spreading fake news and alternative facts is being discussed in popular
media like Netflix’s recent airing of The Social Dilemma. Even contestants on the BBC’s The Rap
Game UK are choosing social network addiction as subject material for their performances
(Jacobs, 2020). Yet not only are governments unable or unwilling to regulate the influence these
platforms have, the Like economy is poised to disrupt education. The relationships between
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learners, their teachers and educational content can be subsumed into the same models utilised
by Facebook and its peers. This is not specific to the recent phenomenon of ‘zoomification’.
Most Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) use the same network design as discussed by Hui
and Halpin, often with the same engagement metrics and algorithmic processing as employed
by major Silicon Valley companies. Khan Academy, one of the biggest platforms for online edu-
cation grew out of YouTube. Some digital education tools like Moodle’s virtual learning environ-
ment (VLE) are more mindful of disruption, by releasing their source code, permitting teachers to
produce local adaptations in accordance with their needs. However, even these often contain
vestiges of algorithmic governmentality, like machine learning models to predict course dropout
instead of preventing it by having learners co-structure their courses (Moodle, n.d.). It is also
doubtful on the whole that learners and teachers are strongly involved in the construction of
these online environments. With IT staff setting up the structure of online components for most
courses, there seems to be little difference in just adopting the pre-packaged systems offered by
Microsoft and Google, along with their attractive offers of cloud storage. One way or another,
educational institutions will have to re-appropriate the pharmakon of digital social media in
order to produce new norms.
However, disruption is never exclusively cured with knowledge in the form of heteronomous
modes of exchange. As discussed, one of the key hallmarks of the Dislike Society is its outbursts
of generalised opposition against content shared across filter bubbles. It does not allow for new
norms to be established in response to the needs of new online-offline co-created localities and
rigidly maintains the filter bubbles produced by its algorithms. As Stiegler confirms, the destruc-
tion of local knowledge by standardising ways of living has also undermined the institutions that
teach us how to mediate between different types of knowledge (Stiegler, 2010, p. 58). This does
not mean that educational reform must abandon all forms of technical innovation. On the con-
trary, Bernard Stiegler defends technics as ‘the pursuit of life by means other than life’ (Stiegler,
2018a, p. 164) and yet it is simultaneously toxic, in that it can encourage the externalisation of
knowledge without a subsequent re-internalisation that would transform it (Stiegler, 2013, loc.
1492). What educational institutions must achieve in order to escape the disruption this causes,
is to rebuild around new modes of environmental exchange that promote life. Stiegler builds his
recommendations on this matter by turning to a thermodynamic understanding of life. What
interests us in particular, is the implication it has for the notion of locality and the digital plat-
forms that seek to erase it.
Maximum thermodynamic entropy is the final state of the universe, in which all energy will
be evenly distributed. Life is impossible at the point of maximum entropy because all chemical
reactions will have ceased. It is a state of equilibrium. At the universal scale, all matter, including
inorganic matter, is tending towards maximum entropy, or death. As Schr€odinger remarks how-
ever, when life is considered at the local scale, it is able to stave off death by absorbing into
itself negative entropy via metabolic exchange (Schr€odinger, 1992, pp. 69–71). He explains that
negative entropy is order, whilst entropy, the state of equilibrium, is disorder. To live is to know
how to order one’s environment to create a beneficial imbalance of energies. In Bernard
Stiegler’s terms, this means finding new knowledge in the form of local ‘negentropic’ exchanges
that run counter to the entropy of disruption (Stiegler, 2015, pp. 29–33). Knowledge of local
exchanges in one environment may not be helpful in another. This presents a strong argument
against the imposition of current digital platforms in education. Most are not designed to allow
for exchanges to be restructured locally, nor have we learned how to successfully apply them to
our specific environments if they were. Instead, any local structuring of exchanges is short
circuited by the flattening universality of Facebook, Google or Microsoft.
Alfred North Whitehead also thinks of knowledge in terms of its enhancement of life. The
type of knowledge we have mostly discussed so far corresponds to Whitehead’s notion of
‘methodology’, which satisfies the urge ‘to live, to live well, to live better’ and can be understood
as a ‘dodge to live’ (Whitehead, 1971, p. 18). Within each environment, there may be different
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methodologies or norms that help its members live better. Collectively, we might group them
under the umbrella of paradigms. Therefore, this knowledge requires another kind of knowledge
that helps select the best norms by which to live. It bears repeating that shifts in an environ-
ment can lead to sudden inadequacies of methodologies to fulfil the promise of a good life and
therefore an encounter with new ones can be curative, in the sense that Canguilhem describes
it. The Dislike Society permits this but only in the toxic or entropic way that does not encourage
the local transformation of paradigms through the adoption of those new methodologies.
Instead, different ways of living are attacked, even if they permit members of other environ-
ments to live well.
The knowledge that helps mediate different methodologies, selecting relevant new ones and
trying them out, is what Whitehead calls Reason:
The essence of Reason in its lowliest forms is its judgments upon flashes of novelty, of novelty in
immediate realization and of novelty which is relevant to appetition but not yet to action. In the stabilized
life there is no room for Reason. (Whitehead, 1971, p. 20)
Whitehead’s Reason produces negative entropy because it creates order out of chaotic
exchanges with an environment. It allows the learner to curatively respond to appetition, which
is the attention we grant to the new, similar to the perpetual distractions of the Dislike Society
(Whitehead, 1971, p. 21). Reason identifies new beneficial methodologies, whilst filtering out the
noise. In this sense, it is directly opposed to The Dislike Society, which automates this process,
excluding learners from it. The anti-life algorithms of the Like economy promote entropy by
choosing our affiliations for us, yet fail to dampen outpourings of hate and abuse. Whilst the
social models they create may be very orderly to algorithms, the users themselves have no
access to them and are only left with apparently chaotic relationships within their environments.
The learner is unable to re-order exchanges for themselves.
Bernard Stiegler also offers an analysis of reason that places emphasis on its negentropic
value. Whilst he does not call it a form of knowledge outright, he explains that reason is learned
(Stiegler, 2012, pp. 245–246). According to him, the role of educational institutions is to shape
the attention of learners. He views reason as a historical iteration of the broader category of
attentional forms, which are closer to what Whitehead calls Reason. For Stiegler, reason is but
one attentional form among many. It is not something we inherently possess and indeed, as is
currently happening as a result of disruption, we can un-learn it. Stiegler explains that the threat
posed by economies of disruption is nothing less than the loss of reason (Stiegler, 2016, p. 71).
As with Whitehead’s Reason, attentional forms serve the negentropic purpose of putting meth-
odologies to work in service of life. Stiegler takes the extra step to propose that even attentional
forms change with time and may no longer suit particular technical environments.
The most comprehensive analysis of appetition-fuelled addiction to stimulation in dis-adjusted
environments comes from Gerald Moore. He links Chad Wellmon’s observation of the develop-
ment of critical philosophy out of “eighteenth-century fears of book addiction” with an analysis
of Plato’s academy emerging as a response to “the intoxicating automations of writing” (Moore,
2019, pp. 120–121). Moore explains that attempts at environmental reorganisation in moments
of crisis occur due to our processes of experiential learning. This entails focusing on the domin-
ant stimuli within this environment, which usually emanate from the technical systems that initi-
ated the dis-adjustment. Attentional forms help us mediate the neuronal input from appetition.
However, if our attentional forms were acquired during a previous phase of metastable relation-
ships with technical environments, they may no longer adequately respond to the new relation-
ships resulting from the dis-adjusted technical systems. What this means is that we need
educating in how to establish new methodologies within dis-adjusted technical systems that
goes beyond the education we received from previous systems. Plato’s academy could
adequately respond to the new technical systems of writing, whereas Kant’s critical philosophy
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could respond to print technology. Each phase shift produced an explosion of stimuli that we
had to learn to incorporate into ways of living.
Moore explains that learning to re-organise relationships with our environments is built into our
neurobiology thanks to the brain’s dopamine reward system. The triggering of dopamine reinfor-
ces learned short-term responses to stimuli that help us to (momentarily) live better, which also
explains the mechanism behind Whitehead’s notion of appetition. According to Moore, addiction
is a side effect of short-circuited learning: neuronal pruning focuses on the strongest stimuli and
desensitisation demands ever greater stimulation. These combine to create a runaway effect of
addiction (Moore, 2019, pp. 122–123). The ‘addict’ sees their world narrowed around the stimulus
that triggers their dopamine response. This phenomenon could further explain the Dislike Society’s
effectiveness at keeping society segmented, offering a different type of addictive stimulus for each
set of consumers. Their attentions become so narrowed that they respond violently and abusively
to anything that does not fit into their dopamine reward cycle. Inducing states of dependency on
their products on a massive scale by triggering our learning processes, which Moore calls
‘dopamining’ (Moore, 2017, p. 68), has greatly benefited Silicon Valley companies. Their direct
input into educational institutions will see the completion of that project.
Because addiction and learning are part of the same neurobiological process, Moore is able to
assert that not all addictions are toxic (Moore, 2019, p. 121). His call for an increase in
‘noodiversity’ does not ask for an end to stimulation but for a balancing of local stimulus against
the excesses of dopamining (Moore 2018). Even some of the processes found in the Dislike
Society could be put to use. Once disapproval shakes us out of our filter bubbles into a shared
communal space of practitioners wanting to live better, we need to find ways of working
together long enough to locally generate negative entropy and thus, new ways of living. Whilst
educational communities are to develop locally, they should still be able to exchange and evolve
on a global scale to prevent stagnation. In this regard it may be helpful to consider Geert
Lovink’s proposal of ‘stacktivism’, which establishes interconnected technical systems on multiple
layers, where the local influences the global and vice versa (Lovink, 2019, pp. 72–76). This way,
communities could produce local ways of living, whilst still engaging with large scale issues like
climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic.
The need for social distancing in 2020 may have encouraged educational institutions and
their members to adopt user friendly, universalising tools to continue learning at a time when
society at large is beginning to wake up to their side effects. As we cease wondering if digital
social media is good for us and begin wondering how we can make something better without
access to the code that makes it work, education must step in to provide solutions locally that
can exchange globally. Whilst adopting pre-existing platforms or ones developed for (not by)
learners and teachers might seem like a temptingly quick fix at this critical stage, their simplicity
is designed to short circuit long term local solutions. We are running out of time to collectively
create ways of living that benefit us instead of feeding the Dislike Society. As can ironically be
heard in YouTube Rewind 2017, ‘vivre ensemble c’est bien, construire ensemble c’est encore
mieux’. This time we need to take it literally and begin building together.
Notes
1. One of the platform’s most popular creators, MrBeast, conducted a small-scale experiment showing how a
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